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that would trigger recapture after the two-
year grace period.  In four private letter
rulings, IRS has ruled that participation in
the 10-year Conservation Reserve Program
does not result in recapture.21  In a 1989
ruling, IRS has indicated that participation
in a similar state-level program likewise
does not result in recapture.22
Legislation was enacted in 1983
specifically providing that participation in
the 1983 Payment-in-Kind program would
not lead to special use valuation
recapture.23  That legislation was not added
to the Internal Revenue Code and expired
with the 1984 wheat PIK program.  IRS
also, in early 1983, issued an announce-
ment and a private letter ruling indicating
that participation by a qualified heir in the
1983 PIK program or other Department of
Agriculture program would not cause the
qualified heir to be treated as having ceased
to use the property for a qualified use for
special use valuation purposes.24
FOOTNOTES
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F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1943);
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  See Rev. Rul. 65-95, 1965-1
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4
 Rev. Rul. 65-98, 1965-1
C.B. 213 (advance and final
diversion payments under
1963 Feed Grain Program
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whichever was earlier; fact
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effective to defer income to
later year).
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  Rev. Rul. 68-44, 1968-1
C.B. 191.
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Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) ¶
14,533 (N.D. Ala. 1966)
(materially participating crop
share landlord).
10
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(cropland adjustment income;
dictum).
14
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(1990).
15
  See I.R.C. § 2032A
(c)(6)(B).
16
  Id.
17
 See I.R.C. § 2032A
(c)(6)(A).
18
 See, e.g., Heffley v.
Commr, 89-2 U.S.T.C. ¶
13,812 (7th Cir. 1989)
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member; qualified use test
not met).
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 I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(7)(A).
20
 See I.R.C.§2032A(b)(5)(A).
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 Ltr. Rul. 8729037, Apr. 21,
1987; Ltr. Rul. 8743004,
July 16, 1987; Ltr. Rul.
8745016, Aug. 7, 1987; Ltr.
Rul. 8802026, Oct. 15,
1987.
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 Ltr. Rul. 8946023, August
18, 1989 (qualified heir's en-
rollment of 9 acres of special
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Reinvest in Minnesota land
conservation program did not
cause recapture of special use
valuation benefits).
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 Pub.L. 98-4, 97 Stat. 7
(1983).
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 Ann. 83-43, I.R.B. 1983-10,
29; Ltr. Rul. 8330016, Apr.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN PERSPECTIVE
THE ABSOLUTE
PRIORITY RULE
A Chapter 11 plan may be confirmed over the objections of
creditors, the so-called "cram down," if the plan does not discrim-
inate unfairly and is fair and equitable to all objecting impaired
classes of creditors.1  The absolute priority rule states that a plan
is not fair and equitable if the debtor, or any junior creditor,
retains an interest in estate business property and unsecured
creditors receive less than full payment on their claims.2
The U.S. Supreme Court has provided an exception to the
absolute priority rule where the debtor contributes money or
money's worth to the business in an amount at least equal to the
debtor's interest in the business.3
The absolute priority rule provides a major obstacle to the
farm debtor in Chapter 11 who wants to keep the farm business
but who has little property not essential to the business with
which to pay unsecured creditors.  Generally, farm debtors have
attempted to use the exception to the absolute priority rule by
claiming a value in money's worth for some of the intangible
aspects of the farm as a continuing business.
In an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case, the farm debtor
claimed the contribution of the debtor's skill and labor as a
contribution in money or money's worth.4  Although the Appeals
Court agreed with the debtor, with some conditions, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed, holding that a contribution of skill and
labor was not a contribution of money's worth to the business.5  
A farm debtor's contribution of future farm profits was held
insufficient to invoke the absolute priority rule.6  Farm debtors'
contribution of farm machinery worth $20,000 over five years of
Chapter 11 plan and contribution of $30,000 cash to farm opera-
tions were not substantial contribution of fresh capital to over-
come the absolute priority rule where $1.1 million was owed to
unsecured creditors.7
A recent Kansas bankruptcy case illustrates several other
aspects of the absolute priority rule.8  The debtors owned a farm
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under a sole proprietorship and in their Chapter 11 plan proposed
to contribute their labor and exempt property to the farm business
to satisfy the absolute priority rule.  The debtors' attorney also
agreed to be paid out of future farm earnings instead of estate
property.
The debtors claimed that because the farm business had little
or no "going concern" value, the debtors did not retain any interest
of value.  The court rejected this argument, noting that the U.S.
Supreme Court in Ahlers held that the retained control over the
business and possible future earnings from the business were
sufficient retained interests to invoke the absolute priority rule.
The court, after some discussion as to whether the exception
to the absolute priority rule still exists, held that even under the
exception, the debtor's contribution must be necessary for the
reorganization and must be substantial and exceed the value of the
debtors' retained interests in the business.  The debtors were held
not to have met the burden of showing their entitlement to the
exception.
FOOTNOTES
1
 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1).
2
 11 U.S.C.§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
3
 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Products Co., 308 U.S. 106
(1939).  See In re Henke, 90
B.R. 451 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1988) (absolute priority rule
did not bar farm debtor's
Chapter 11 plan where debtor
would invest non-farm
income in plan payments).
4
 In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388
(8th Cir. 1986), rev'd 485
U.S. 197 (1988).
5
 Id.    See also In re Stegall,
64 B.R. 296 (Bankr. C.D.
Ill. 1986), aff'd 85 B.R. 510
(C.D. Ill. 1987) (farmer-
debtor's labor may not be
considered as contribution
sufficient to overcome
absolute priority rule); In re
Rudy Debruycker Ranch,
Inc., 84 B.R. 187 (Bankr. D.
Mont. 1988) (debtor's
contribution of services and
some property to farm
operations not sufficient to
allow exception to absolute
priority rule).
6
 In re Olson, 80 B.R. 935
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987)
(absolute priority rule not
met where secured creditor
would not receive full
payment and farmer-debtor's
contribution would be from
profits from farming).
7
 In re Snyder, 105 B.R. 898
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989).
8
 In re Drimmel, 108 B.R. 284
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1989).
Cases, Regulations and Statutes
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL
AVOIDABLE TRANSFER.  Chapter 7
farm debtors had granted a new mortgage
on farm land to creditor in exchange for
release of mortgage on other land.  The
trustee had argued that because the previous
mortgage was junior to other liens in
excess of the property's value, the release
of the old mortgage did not constitute new
value received for the new mortgage and
thus the granting of the new mortgage
within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing
was an avoidable preferential transfer.  The
court ruled that the exchange of mortgages
was a contemporaneous exchange for new
value.  In re  Quade, 108 B.R. 6 8 1
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1989).
ESTATE PROPERTY.  An ERISA quali-
fied employee pension and profit sharing
plan was not estate property because the
plan qualified as a spendthrift trust under
Missouri law.  In re  Boon, 108 B . R .
697 (W.D. Mo. 1989), rev'g 9 0
B.R. 988 (Bankr. W.D. M o .
1988) .
EXEMPTIONS.  The Illinois exemption
for payments from pension (and other
types of) plans was held not to apply to a
lump sum distribution of the debtor's
entire interest in the plan.  In re
Summers, 108 B.R. 200 (Bankr.
S.D. Ill. 1989).
The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma held that the
exemption for qualified individual
retirement accounts was not preempted by
ERISA.  In re  Ridgway, 108 B . R .
294 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989).
A different Oklahoma Bankruptcy
Court has held that the federal ERISA does
preempt the Oklahoma exemption for
retirement plans but also held that such
plans are exempt under ERISA as a federal
exemption.  In re  Burns, 108 B . R .
308 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989).
The Oklahoma exemption for tax
qualified retirement plans was held
unconstitutional because it did not limit
exemption to amount necessary for support
of debtor and did not exclude retirement
plans over which the debtor had access to
the funds.  In re  Garrison, 108 B . R .
760 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989); In
re  Walker, 108 B.R. 769 (Bankr.
N.D. Okla. 1989).
LIEN AVOIDANCE.  A debtor who had
claimed a homestead exemption under state
law for a mobile home was not allowed to
avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase
money lien against the mobile home as
household goods under Section 522(f)(2).
In re  Coonse, 108 B.R. 6 6 1
(Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989).
SETOFF.  The Commodity Credit Corpo-
ration attempted a setoff of a deficiency on
a CCC crop storage loan owed by a farm
corporation against disaster payments due
to the sole shareholder from crop disaster
losses in the shareholder's separate pecan
growing operations.  The court denied the
setoff because lack of mutuality of debtors
where the corporation and the shareholder
were considered separate entities.  In re
Jones, 107 B.R. 888 (Bankr. N . D .
Miss. 1989).
   CHAPTER 11   
MODIFICATION OF PLAN.  Dairy farm
debtors' Chapter 11 plan provided that
priority city real property taxes would be
paid in full in installments over length of
plan.  The plan also gave the debtors the
right to object to any claims under the plan
within 60 days after confirmation of the
plan.  The court denied the debtors' attempt
to bifurcate the real property tax claim into
secured and unsecured claims after
confirmation of the plan because the plan
had provided that the claims would be paid
in full.  In re  Henderberg, 108 B . R .
407 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1989).
